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ABSTRACT
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Federal Circuit's test for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction explaining that the law requires an "all circumstances"
approach and that the "reasonable apprehension of suit" test is not sufficient. The Federal
Circuit's subsequent applications of the "all circumstances" test show that a potential infringer
is likely to sustain jurisdiction where the potential infringer and the patentee have merely
communicated their adverse positions to one another. On the other hand, the Federal Circuit
is not likely to find jurisdiction where the patent-holder has not communicated, or has vaguely
communicated, its position to the potential infringer. The focus on clarity of communication
renders a patentee unable to effectively negotiate licensing agreements without putting itself
at risk of litigation. This risk increases the cost of enforcing a patent and may discourage
participation in the patent system. A system of post-grant review through a third party, nonprofit organization would provide a cost-effective means to solve validity disputes which
alleviates some of the financial burden of enforcing a patent. This savings would encourage
the filing of patent applications and promote innovation.
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INTRODUCTION

The state of declaratory judgment ("DJ") jurisdiction in patent law has become
analogous to the "Secret Word" theme made popular on the late 1980's children's
television show Pee-Wee's Playhouse.1 In every episode, the host Pee-Wee Herman
would trick the show's characters and guests into saying the "Secret Word" which
induced a loud, wacky response from the audience and cast.2 As applied to DJ
jurisdiction in potential patent infringement contexts, the "Secret Word" is
"infringement" and the "wacky response" is a DJ suit.
3
The Supreme Court's decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
broadened the standard for DJ jurisdiction in patent cases from "a reasonable
apprehension of suit" test to an "all circumstances" test.4 While a DJ action is a
common counter-claim in an infringement suit, this comment focuses on a party's
ability to sustain a DJ action against a patentee in the absence of a coinciding
infringement suit. Typically, the party will ask for a declaration of invalidity, non5
infringement, or both.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's ("Federal Circuit") applications of
the "all circumstances" test focuses largely upon the parties' communications with
one another. 6
When parties to a potential infringement suit have clearly
communicated their detailed and adverse positions to each other, the Federal Circuit
is likely to find DJ jurisdiction. 7 Conversely, if the correspondence between the
parties does not establish each party's position or if there is a lack of correspondence
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The John Marshall Law School. Thank you to Professor David L.
Schwartz, Andrew Landsman, and Graham M. Liccardi for their substantive and editorial
assistance.
1 Harry M. Benshoff, The Museum of Broadcast Communications, http://www.museum.tv/
archives/etv/P/htmlP/peeweespla/peeweepla.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009). Pee-Wee's Playhouse
was a children's show starring Paul Reubens as "Pee-Wee Herman." Id. Airing from 1986 to 1991,
Pee-Wee's Playhouse, was a huge success with adults and children and won six Emmy awards. Id.
2 E.g., Pee-Wee's Playhouse: Ice Cream Soup (CBS television broadcast 1986). The reoccurring
"Secret Word" theme involved the audience being told what that episode's secret word was, and if
the word was said, the audience and characters, alike, were to "scream real loud" to spring the joke
on whoever said the word. See id.
3 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
4 Id. at 127, 132 n.ll.
5 E.g., SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(invalidity and non-infringement); Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1342 n.12
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (non-infringement only).
6 See, e.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1286 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("In short, because Guardian assertsthat it is owed royalties based on specific... activities by
Sony, and because Sony contends that it has a right to engage in those activities without a license,
there is an actual controversy... within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act.") (emphasis
added).
7 See id. at 1285.
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between the parties, the court is likely to find that insufficient controversy exists to
support DJ jurisdiction.8 Thus, a patentee may avoid DJ jurisdiction by vague
communication to the potential DJ plaintiff or by no communication at all.9 This
situation devalues patents by forcing the patentee to put itself at risk of litigation in
order to negotiate licenses. 10 A less expensive avenue for adjudicating disputed
patent claims would increase the value of patents and encourage participation in the
patent system."
The Background section of this comment provides an overview of the
Declaratory Judgment Act and MedImmune caselaw. It also provides summaries of
the Hatch-Waxman Act's vehicle for establishing sufficient controversy, proposed
post-grant patent review legislation, and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy. The Analysis section illustrates how the applicable precedent puts
patent-holders at an unreasonable risk of a DJ suit, devaluing the patent. Lastly,
the Proposal section sets forth a third-party, post-grant review process modeled after
proposed post-grant review legislation and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy. The proposed, cost-effective process works to alleviate the loss in
patent value resulting from the unreasonable risk of a DJ suit.

I.BACKGROUND

A. The DeclaratoryJudgment Act
The Declaratory Judgment Act,' 2 passed in 1934, was meant to provide access to
courts for would-be litigants. 13 Its proponents had patent law in mind, and sought to
remedy the patentee's paralyzing hold, through extra-judicial threats, over an alleged
infringer. 14 Present day scholars assert that intellectual property law generally, and
8 Prasco, 537 F.3d at 1340 n.8 ("In addition, the lack of clearly delineated, adverse positions by

the parties diminishes the 'definite[ness] and concrete[ness]' of any potential controversy and its
fitness for current judicial resolution." (alterations in original)).
9 See, e.g., id. at 1340 (holding that the lack of clear and adverse positions diminishes the
justiciability of a controversy and its fitness for judicial resolution.).
10See Angela Foster, Case or Controversy? The Impact of the New DeclaratoryJudgment
Rulings on Biotechnology, THE SCITECH LAWYER, Fall 2008, at 18, 22.
11 See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN,
POST-GRANT REVIEW OF PATENT CLAIMS (Apr. 2, 2003) ("By using the [PTO]'s expertise, these [postgrant] challenges could be adjudicated for less money and in less time than by civil suit."), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/sr2.htm (hereinafter "USPTO, POST-GRANT
REVIEW").

12Declaratory Judgment Act, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955, 955-56 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (2006)).
13Lorelei Ritchie De Larena, Re-EvaluatingDeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdictionin Intellectual
PropertyDisputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957, 958 (2008).
14
Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
abrogatedby.MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.l (2007).
[A] patent owner attempts extra-judicial patent enforcement with scare-thecustomer-and-run tactics that infect the competitive environment of the business
community with uncertainty and insecurity. Before the [Declaratory Judgment]
Act, competitors victimized by that tactic were rendered helpless and immobile so
long as the patent owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue. After the
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patent law more specifically, provide a fertile ground for DJ jurisprudence though
they may disagree on the application of the test. 15 For purposes of this comment, I
assume that a court will exercise its discretion to here a DJ case if the court makes a
finding of sufficient controversy under the "all circumstances" test promulgated by
16
the Supreme Court in MedImmune and applied by the Federal Circuit.

B. MedImmune Case law
Prior to 2007, the Federal Circuit articulated a two-pronged test to determine
whether it had DJ jurisdiction over patent disputes. 17 To find sufficient controversy,
the court would need to determine (1) that the patentee's conduct created a
reasonable apprehension of suit between the patentee and the DJ plaintiff, and (2)
that the DJ plaintiffs conduct amounted to infringing activity or demonstrated
concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity.18 In January 2007, the
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of suit
requirement," and reaffirmed the test for DJ jurisdiction as "whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." 19
In surveying post-MedImunne caselaw, it is important to note that while the
court scrutinizes individual facts, the ultimate finding of DJ jurisdiction rests on the
sum of all facts and circumstances. 20 The following cases represent a cross-section of
the facts and issues that the Federal Circuit has found to be relevant in its
determination of DJ jurisdiction.
In MedImmune, the Court held that under a patent-licensing agreement where
royalties are paid under protest and with a reservation of rights, an actual
controversy exists sufficient to give the court DJ jurisdiction. 21 The court held that a
licensee does not need to breach a contract in order to have DJ jurisdiction.22 In a
ruling later that year, the Federal Circuit found DJ jurisdiction in a circumstance
[Declaratory Judgment] Act, those competitors were no longer restricted to an in
terrorem choice between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent
infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the air by
suing for a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests.
Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 735 (citation omitted).
15De Larena, supra note 13, at 959, 964-65, 977 (stating that to properly find DJ jurisdiction a
court must first find baseline DJ Act jurisdiction, and then in its discretion, decide to hear the case).
16 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127, 132 n.11 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312
U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
17SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cr. 2007).
18 Id.
Arguably, the second prong of the old test is still valid. See Cat Tech LLC v.
TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
19MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127, 132 n.11 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312
U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
20 See, e.g., Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
("[T]hough a defendant's failure to sign a covenant not to sue is one circumstance to consider in
evaluating the totality of the circumstances, it is not sufficient to create an actual controversy-some
affirmative actions by the defendant will also generally be necessary.").
21MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 128, 137.
22Id. at 137.
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similar to the one in MedImmune, but also relied on the patentee's threat of suit if
royalties were not paid and the fact that the product at issue was the subject of a
23
previous suit between the patentee and another licensee.
When the parties are not engaged in a formal agreement, the court looks to any
correspondence between the parties and the conduct of each party to determine if
their positions are sufficiently adverse and an actual controversy exists. 24 In
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics,Inc.,25 the patentee, STMicroelectronics, sent a
letter to a competitor, SanDisk, suggesting certain patents which "may be of interest"
and after further correspondence, the parties met to discuss their positions. 26 At the
meeting, STMicroelectronics made a four to five hour presentation on how some of
SanDisk's products infringed certain identified patents. 27 At the conclusion of the
meeting, STMicroelectronics expressed that it had no intention of suing for
infringement. 28
The Federal Circuit held that the meeting evinced sufficient
controversy and STMicroelectronics's expression of intent not to sue did not comport
29
with the meeting's conduct and, therefore, did not prevent DJ jurisdiction.
Moreover, in the absence of the parties actually meeting each other, the Federal
Circuit has held that an actual controversy may exist. 30 In Micron Technology, Inc.,
v. Mosaid Technologies, Inc.,31 the court found that four warning letters sent by the
patentee to the alleged infringer that strongly advise a licensing agreement, coupled
with the patentee's aggressive patent enforcement activities targeting other alleged
32
infringers, created a sufficient controversy.
The Federal Circuit has also held that mere correspondence may establish an
actual case or controversy. 33
In Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media
Technologies, Ltd.,34 the court found that the correspondence between the parties
during 2004 and 2005 established a sufficient controversy because each party
35
communicated its position and supporting analysis in a clear and detailed manner.
The court held that because the patentee asserted a right to royalties based on the
alleged infringer's activities while the alleged infringer asserted that it had a right to
engage in the activities without a license, an actual controversy existed between the
parties. 36 Sony creates a DJ threshold which a party meets when it clearly

GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 501 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
E.g., SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc. 480 F.3d 1372, 1374-76, 1382-84 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (considering the correspondence of the parties and their meetings with each other to
determine if an actual controversy existed which the court could adjudicate).
25 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
26 Id. at 1374-75.
27 Id. at 1375.
28 Id. at 1376.
29 Id. at 1382-83.
30 E.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 901-02 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
31 518 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
32 Id. at 899, 901-02.
33 E.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1285 n.9, 1286 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
34 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
35 Id. at 1285 n.9, 1286.
36 Id. at 1286.
23 Adenta
24
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communicates its adverse position. 37 If the other party responds in kind, then under
83
Sony, a sufficient controversy exists between the parties.
The Federal Circuit has never found sufficient controversy when there was no
meaningful correspondence between the DJ plaintiff and the patentee. 39 In Prasco,
LLC v. Medicis PharmaceuticalCorp.,40 the plaintiff brought a DJ action seeking a
declaration of non-infringement regarding one of its products and the defendant's
42
of
patent. 41 The court disagreed with Prasco's argument that the marking
defendant's product with the patent number combined with a prior infringement suit
between the same parties on an unrelated patent amounts to sufficient controversy.43
44
During the suit, Prasco sent Medicis a letter requesting a covenant not sue.
Medicis responded with a letter stating that it would not withdraw its motion to
dismiss, effectively ignoring Prasco's request. 45 The court stated that the patentee's
decision to ignore Prasco's request for a covenant not to sue did not create a sufficient
46
controversy.

C Hatch-Waxman DeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdiction
Another method of establishing sufficient controversy involves a situation that
arises under the Hatch-Waxman Act ("Hatch-Waxman"), 47 which governs the Food
48
and Drug Administration's ("FDA") approval process of new and generic drugs.
Hatch-Waxman establishes a five-step process relevant to DJ jurisdiction. 49 First,
the pioneering drug company must submit a New Drug Application ("NDA") to the
FDA, which informs the FDA of all the patents covering the drug and its method of
making.5 0 The FDA lists these patents and others in a publication commonly known

37

Id.

38 Id.
39 E.g., Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
40 537 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
41 Id. at 1334.
42 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2006) (marking a patented invention with the applicable patent number
services as notice for purposes of damage calculations).
43 Prasco,537 F.3d at 1340-41.
44 Id. at 1334.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1341.
47 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360(cc) (2006), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2006); see Caraco Pharm. Labs.,
Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1282 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("The Hatch-Waxman Act is the
name commonly used to refer to the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, Pub.L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360(cc) (2000), 35 U.S.C.
§§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)), as amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).").
48 21 U.S.C. § 355(a); see Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1282
(Fed. Cir. 2008) ("The goal of the [Hatch-Waxman] Act is to '[strike] a balance between two
competing policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and development of new drugs and (2)
enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of those drugs to market."' (citing Andrx
Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) (alterations in original).
49 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(b); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2); see also Caraco,527 F.3d at 1282-85.
50 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)-(c); Caraco,527 F.3d at 1282.
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as the "Orange Book."5 1 Drugs that are approved by the FDA are published in the
52
Orange Book and are known as "listed drugs."
Second, the generic drug company may file an "Abbreviated New Drug
Application" ("ANDA"), which states that the generic drug is a bioequivalent to a
listed drug and, therefore, can rely on the safety studies of the listed drug. 53
Additionally, the ANDA filer must certify one of four options. 54 The fourth option,
relevant here, certifies that the patent referred to for the listed drug is invalid or that
the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug will not infringe the patent.55 A
company filing under the fourth option is known as a "Paragraph IV ANDA filer" and
must submit a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis for its position of
56
patent invalidity or non-infringement.
Third, Hatch-Waxman facilitates early resolution of the patent dispute by
57
providing that filing a Paragraph IV ANDA constitutes an act of infringement.
Hatch-Waxman also includes provisions to provide incentive for generic drug
companies to file ANDAs58 and allows the NDA filer forty-five days to sue the ANDA
59
filer for infringement before the ANDA filer can sue for a declaratory judgment.
When the forty-five day limit is up, the ANDA filer may file a DJ action on the
60
relevant patents.
Conceptually, the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer is simply a specific application
of the acknowledged DJ standard. The situation is virtually identical to that of Sony
Electronics, Inc. v. Guarding Media Technologies, Ltd. because the Paragraph IV
ANDA filer must submit a detailed notice to the patentee. 6 1 The detailed statement
combined with the patent-holders listing in the Orange Book establishes clear and
adverse positions.6 2 Here, the Sonythreshold is satisfied.

D. Post-GrantReview
The concept of a post-grant patent review provides the foundation for the
Proposal discussed in Section III. While Congress has proposed legislation for a post-

51 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH

THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS iv, add. (29th ed. 2008)
downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf.
52 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).

available at http://www.fda.gov/

53 Id at § 355(j)(2)(A); see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990).
54 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
55 Id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
56 Id. at § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(II).
57 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
58 Eg., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
59 Id. at § 355()(5)(C).
60 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5).
61Compare 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iv)(J) (requiring that ANDAs include a detailed statement
of factual and legal bases of the invalidity or non-infringement opinion) with Sony Elecs., Inc. v.
Guarding Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a sufficient

controversy existed because the parties correspondence clearly established their position, which
were adverse, and supported their positions with research and analysis that strongly represented

that which is to be expected during litigation).
62 See Sony, 497 F.3d at 1285-86.
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grant review process, it has not voted such a process into law.6 3 For example the
proposed Patent Reform Act of 2007, which included post-grant review provisions,
passed in the House of Representatives but was never brought to the Senate floor in
part due controversial provisions regarding patent infringement damages.6 4 A brief
overview of the procedure, as proposed in 200765 and 200866 will illustrate its
superiority to current methods of adjudicating the validity of a patent.
Any third party seeking the cancellation of a patent claim would initiate the
post-grant review procedure.6 7 The party petitioning for review to invalidate a claim
would provide the claim information, reasons why it believes the claim to be invalid,
and any evidence in support thereof.68 For the review to be instituted, the Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO") would have to make a finding that the petitioner made
69
a sufficient initial showing of unpatentability.
Upon notice of the institution of a review proceeding, the patent-holder may
respond by challenging, with evidentiary support, the assertions in the petition, or
the patent-holder may respond by amending the claim to avoid the assertions in the
petition.7 0 Throughout the proceeding, both parties may submit supplemental
evidence, which would be governed by the rules of discovery to be set by the PTO.71
If a party institutes a review, the PTO is required to render a decision within
one year.7 2 A decision that invalidates a claim extinguishes the patent-holder's
rights as to that claim.7 3 A decision that upholds the validity of a claim is binding on
74
the party that sought to invalidate the claim.

E. Uniform Domain -NameDispute Resolution Policy
The Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy ("UDRP")75 is an
excellent example of a private/government partnership that brings efficient results to
intellectual property disputes. UDRP is a policy adopted by the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN").76
ICANN is a private-public
partnership, non-profit organization which manages and oversees the coordination of
63Angela Payne James, Shri Abhyankar, & David S. Frist, Recent Developments in Patent
Law and the PotentialImpact on PatentLitigation, in Patent Litigation 2009, at 249, 282 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, and Literary Property Course, Handbook Series No. 982, 2009), available at
WL, 982 PLI/Pat 249; e.g., H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. sec. 6() (2007) (as passed Sept. 7, 2007) (failing
in the Senate).
64 James, Abhyankar, & Frist, supranote 63, at 249.
65H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007).
66S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 5(c) (as introduced Sept. 25, 2008).
67 H.R. 1908 § 6 (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 321).
68 S. 3600 § 5(c) (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 323).
69Id. (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 327).
70Id. (proposed 35 U.S.C. §§ 330, 332).
71 Id. (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 329).
72 Id. (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 329(b)(1)).
73 Id. (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 335).
74 H.R. 1908, ll0th Cong. § 6 (2007) (proposed 35 U.S.C. § 335).
75 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME

DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (October 24, 1999), available at. http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/
policy/htm (hereinafter "UDRP").
76Id. at para. 1.
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the internet's domain name system.7 7 When an entity registers a domain name with
ICANN, the entity agrees to be bound by the UDRP.78
The UDRP provides for a "Mandatory Administrative Proceeding" by which a
trademark owner can challenge the registration of a domain name.7 9 The trademark
owner files a complaint against the registrant with an approved "administrativedispute-resolution service provider."8 0
The complaint must allege that (1) the
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the trademark, (2) the registrant
has no rights or legitimate interest in the domain name, and (3) the domain name
was registered in bad faith.8 ' The registrant files its response with the provider, and
the provider selects an "Administrative Panel" to render a decision to the provider as
to whether the domain name should be cancelled, transferred, or remain
82
unchanged.
The provider then notifies ICANN which enforces the Administrative Panel's
decision.8 3 A party can delay ICANN's enforcement by filing a civil action within ten
days of the decision.8 4 Courts, however, need not give any deference to the
85
Administrative Panel's decision.

II. ANALYSIS
The Federal Circuit's application of the "all circumstances" test discourages
patentees from establishing a clear position when negotiating a patent dispute, so
that the patentee may avoid DJ jurisdiction.86 On the other hand, it is always in the
potential infringer's interest to be as clear and direct as possible in presenting its
position.8 7 This imbalance makes negotiations cumbersome, and the patent less
valuable. A set of hypothetical situations will illustrate this point.

77

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, General Information, http://

www.icann.org/tr/english.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
78 UDRP, supra note 75, at para. 1.
79Id. at para. 4.
80 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, RULES FOR UNIFORM DOMAIN

NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY, at para. 3(a) (October 24, 1999), available at. http://
www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm (hereinafter "UDRP Rules").
81 Id. at para. 3(b)(ix).
82 Id. at paras. 5, 6.
83UDRP, supra note 75, para. 3(c).
84 Id. at para. 4(k).
85 Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentismo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 623, 626
(4th Cir. 2003).
86 Compare Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (holding that a sufficient controversy existed because the parties correspondence, which
included legal research and analysis, clearly established their adverse positions), with Prasco, LLC
v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that the patentee's elusive
response to the plaintiffs request not to sue did not give rise to a sufficient case or controversy).
87 See Sony, 497 F.3d at 1285-86.
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A. Situation 1: PotentialInfringerMakes First Contact
Company makes a product that potentially infringes Patentee's patent. When
alleged infringing Company discovers the patent, it has a few options.8 8 One
possibility may be to continue production, disregard the patent and hope that
Patentee does not find out.8 9 This course of action, however, exposes Company to
heightened damages due to willful infringement. 90 Alternatively, Company may stop
production and cut its losses, rarely a favorable option.9 1
Company's most prudent course of action is to notify Patentee. 92
This
notification should be as clear and detailed as possible to fulfill Company's side of the
Sony threshold. 93 Providing an unclear position only stalls negotiation and suit,
which does not benefit Company. 94 Upon receipt of Company's notification and clear
95
position, Patentee has three viable courses of action.

1. Option 1: File an InfringementSuit
In response to Company's notification, Patentee may bring an infringement
suit. 96 Bringing suit, however, may not be the best option here. Infringement suits
are costly.97 Moreover, the Patentee only has limited knowledge of Company's
activities. Granted, Company provided a detailed letter on its position, but there
could be more products or patents at issue. Suing at this juncture would push any
further information gathering into the discovery period. 98 During discovery, the
parties will have to abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and will be subject
to discovery orders. 99 All of which, could be avoided if Patentee gathered the
information before commencing suit. 100 Filing an infringement complaint upon
receipt of Company's notification, would lead to heavy discovery costs incurred by
both parties. 1 1 Patentee could avoid these costs if it delays filing the infringement
suit.102

88 See Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("In
a normal negotiation, the potential licensee has three basic choices, forego all use of the invention;

pay an agreed royalty; infringe the patent and risk litigation."), overruledbyKnorr-Bremse Systeme

Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
89 See Fromson,853 F.2d at 1576.
90 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-85 (2006).
91 See Fromson,853 F.2d at 1576.
92 See

id.

93 See Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guarding Media Techs., Ltd, 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir.
2007).

94 See generally55 AM. JUR. Trials §§ 11-15 (2009).
95 See Fromson,853 F.2d at 1576.
96See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).

97 Matthew B. Zisk, Mediation and Settlement of PatentDisputes in the Shadow of the Pubhc
Interest, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 481, 491-92 (1999).
98
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
99 Id.
100 Id. at R. 1, 3 (providing that the federal rules only apply once an action has been filed).
101 Zisk, supra note 97, at 491-92.
102 See id.
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2. Option 2: Do Nothing
Another option would be for Patentee to do nothing and incur whatever losses
are attributable to Company's activities. 0 3 This option would be viable if Patentee
fully agreed with Company's analysis or if Patentee believed that its losses due to
Company's activity was negligible. At this stage in the hypothetical, however,
Patentee would be basing its decision solely on one letter from Company. It would
not be prudent for Patentee to follow this course of action. Further inquiry could
suggest that Patentee is owed royalties and that there may be other relevant
activities not mentioned in Company's initial notification.

3. Option 3: Response Letter
10 4
The third and probably most reasonable course of action is a response letter.
The Patentee experiences conflicting influences about what he should include in the
response letter. 105 If the Patentee establishes a clear position, intending to expedite
the dispute's resolution, he would satisfy his side of the Sony threshold and be
subject to a DJ suit brought by Company. 0 6 If, instead, Patentee responds with a
vague or uninformative position or assertion, it does not risk a DJ suit.107
The unresponsive Patentee situation is analogous to the fact pattern in Prasco
where the patent-holder responded to the DJ plaintiffs request for a covenant not to
sue by stating that the patent-holder did not plan to withdraw its motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction. 08
The court found that this lack of meaningful
correspondence showed an insufficient case or controversy to sustain DJ
jurisdiction. 10 9 A patentee seeking to avoid a DJ suit should not reveal its position in
the dispute. 110
A vague response, however, does not work to resolve the parties' dispute."' In
responding to Company's notification, Patentee is forced to choose between risking
DJ litigation and preventing meaningful negotiation.

See Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1576.
See id.
105 Compare Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guarding Media Techs., Ltd, 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (finding that each party's correspondence clearly established its position which was adverse to
the other parties, and establishes sufficient controversy to sustain declaratory judgment
jurisdiction) with Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(holding that the patentee's vague response to a request not to sue did not give rise to a sufficient
case or controversy).
106 See Sony, 497 F.3d at 1285-86.
107 See Prasco, 537 F.3d at 1341.
108 Id. at 1334.
103

104

109 Id. at 1341.

110 See id.

ill See generally55 AM. JUR. Trials §§ 11-15 (2009).
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B. Situation 2: PatenteeMakes FirstContact
Patentee finds itself in a similar situation as in Situation 1 when Patentee is the
one who discovers Company's activities and believes that it infringes the patent. At
this point, Patentee has the same three options as above. 112 It may sue for
infringement (Option 1), incur a loss due to Company's activities (Option 2), or he
may notify Company (Option 3).113 Notification, like the response letter discussed
114
above, is probably the most prudent course of action.
At this point, Situation 2 may be a little more forgiving to Patentee than
Situation 1. As above, a notification that provides a detailed analysis of Patentee's
position would satisfy half of the Sony threshold, which requires the parties to
establish clear and adverse positions in order to find sufficient controversy to sustain
a DJ action. 115 The detailed notification would expose Patentee to DJ jurisdiction if
Company provides a detailed analysis of an adverse position in return. 116 A vague
notification, however, such as one that merely mentions "patents of interest," would
not satisfy the Sony threshold and would notify Company of the potential
infringement.11 7 This course of action would at least give Patentee a chance to
evaluate Company's position and its willingness to negotiate a settlement.
Unfortunately for Patentee, when Company responds with a detailed analysis
and asks for Patentee's position, the parties are brought back to Situation 1 and
Patentee must chose Option 1, 2, or 3.118 Regardless of which party provides the
initial correspondence, Patentee always has to choose between risking a DJ suit by
establishing his clear position and providing meaningless correspondence resulting in
stalling resolution of the dispute. 119
Essentially, when Medimmunds "all
circumstances" test is applied to patent disputes, it forces the patent-holder to do
nothing and incur losses or to bring a costly infringement suit. 2 0 There is little room
12 1
for negotiation prior to suit.

C. Conflicting with DeclaratoryJudgment Act Policy
The Declaratory Judgment Act was meant to give a remedy to those being
coerced or harassed by someone who possesses an allegedly superior right. 2 2 In

112
113

See supra sec. II.A.
See supra sec. II.A.

114 See

supra sec. II.A.

115

Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guarding Media Techs., Ltd, 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

116

See id.

See id.
See supra sec. II.A.
119Compare Sony, 497 F.3d at 1285-86 (finding that clearly established, adverse positions
establishes sufficient controversy to sustain declaratory judgment jurisdiction) with Prasco, LLC v.
Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that vague correspondence does
not evince to sufficient controversy).
120 See supra secs. II.A-B.
121 See id.
122 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007) ("The dilemma posed by
that coercion-putting the challenger to the choose between abandoning his rights or risking
117
118
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patent disputes, however, broadening of the DJ jurisdiction standard can be used as
coercion against the patentee. 123 An alleged infringer can coerce a more favorable
settlement with the patentee by threatening a DJ suit, even though the patentee
wishes to settle the dispute outside of court. 124 In patent disputes, the Declaratory
Judgment Act has surpassed its goal of equalizing the set of weapons available to the
adverse parties and has given the alleged infringer a substantial advantage in
125
negotiations.

D. Conflicting with the U.S. Constitution
The United States Constitution provides that Congress may enact laws that
promote the progress of science and the useful arts. 126 The Federal Circuit's
application of the "all circumstances" test works against the progress of the useful
arts by encouraging inventors to keep their inventions secret.
Patents derive much of their value from licensing agreements. 127 Licensing
agreements are the result of initial correspondence and negotiations between the
patentee and the party seeking the license. 128 As discussed in Situation 1, Option 3
(Patentee's Response Letter), this correspondence and negotiation may expose the
patentee to DJ jurisdiction. 129 Conceivably, for every possible licensing negotiation,
130
the patentee may need to prevail in a DJ suit brought by the other party.
To avoid being hauled into court to litigate multiple potential DJ complaints, an
inventor can simply keep the invention secret. This strategy is viable where the
invention is not easily reverse engineered and where the invention itself, without
patent-licensing revenue, is valuable enough to outweigh the cost of research,
development, and production.131 If the cost of research and development outweighs
the value of the invention, no inventor is likely to pursue the invention.

prosecution-is 'a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to
ameliorate."' (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967)).
123 See Foster, supranote 10, at 22.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 8.
127 See Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios
Through Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 464 (2007) ("The clearest
application of patent and patent portfolio assessment is in the arena of patent licensing. Often,
licensing transactions are straightforward, involving one of a limited number of patents that have
clear commercial analogs, making accurate valuation tenable."). See generally Mohammad S.
Rahman, Patent Valuation:Impacts on Damages,6 U. BALT.INTELL. PROP. L.J. 145 (Spring 1998).
128 See 55 AM. JUR. Trials § 15 (2009).
129 See Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir.
2007).

See Foster, supranote 10, at 22.
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
Protection:A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 371, 391-92, 403
130

131 See

(2002).
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There is a distinction between the value of the invention and the value of the
patent. 132 An invention derives its value from its marketability or usefulness. 133 The
value of the patent is derived from license agreements and maintaining an advantage
over competitors in the industry. 34 Though there is a distinction, a valuable
135
invention increases the market advantage that the patent secures.
The broadened DJ standard decreases the value of a patent by decreasing the
profitability of license agreements. 136 If this decrease in patent value crosses the
137
threshold of profitability, inventors will no longer pursue patent-protection.
Without patents, inventors will only recognize profits from the actual use of the
invention and some initial sales, until someone copies the invention. 138 Thus,
inventors will only pursue inventions that have value through their use. 139

E. Summary ofAnalysis
The Federal Circuit's application of the "all circumstances" test for DJ
jurisdiction makes it difficult for a patentee to have meaningful negotiations with a
potential licensee. Engaging in meaningful negotiations puts the patentee at risk of
a DJ suit and can result in increased costs through litigation. 140 To avoid these risks
and costs, inventors are less likely to seek patent protection and are more likely to
keep inventions secret.' 4 ' Moreover, inventors will only pursue an invention that has
142
use-derived value that outweighs its cost of research, development, and production.
A system that promotes this limited class of profitable inventions is not concurrent
143
with the limitations of the U.S. Constitution.

III. PROPOSAL
An adversarial, post-grant review procedure would alleviate the dilemma that
the "all circumstances test" places on patent-holders. This procedure would be less
expensive and more expedient than litigation in the district courts. 144 The decrease
132See id. at 403; see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (providing two acceptable damage

calculations: (1) reasonable compensation which is based on the value of the invention or (2) a
reasonable royalty which is based on the value of a license).
133

See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 131, at 403.

134

See Kramer, supra note 127, at 464.

135See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 131, at 403.
136

See Foster, supranote 10, at 22.

See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 131, at 403.
supra note 131 (discussing business and marketing
considerations with regard to whether an inventor pursues patent or trade secret protection).
139 See generallyid.
140 See Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir.
137

138See generally Beckerman-Rodau,

2007).

141 See

generallyBeckermanRodau, supra note 131.

See generallyid
143 See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 8.
142

144Kevin

B.C.

A. Meehan, Shopping for Expedient Inexpensive & PredictablePatent Litigation,

INTELL. PROP.

& TECH. F., Nov. 2008, at 1, 10 (asserting that proponents of a post-grant review
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in litigation expenses increases the value of the patent and works to avoid the
scenario discussed in the Analysis above. 145
Unfortunately, it would be
unmanageable for the already overburdened PTO to take on another
responsibility. 1 46 A third-party, post-grant review proceeding, analogous to the
proposed post-grant review is viable, however, and would strengthen the patent
system by providing the low-cost relief that patentees need. A basic framework for
such a review process is set forth below.

A. The 'Post-GrantReview Organization"
The "Post-Grant Review Organization" or "PGRO" would be organized similarly
to ICANN and the UDRP. PGRO would be a public-private, non-profit group that
would be in charge of the administration of the review proceeding. 147 PGRO would be
created through a Memorandum of Understanding ("MoU") between the Executive
Branch, the PTO, and PGRO.148 The MoU would recognize PGRO as the primary
forum for patent validity disputes, would set goals for PGRO, and would establish a
high deference for the PGRO decisions. 149 The MoU would also provide that as a
condition for receiving a patent, the patentee would agree to resolve validity disputes
before PGRO.150

1. PGRO Structure
151
PGRO would be divided into an administrative branch and a decision branch.
The administrative branch would be responsible for setting PGRO policy and
procedure for initiating the proceeding before the decision branch.152 The decision
branch would review the submitted documents and evidence and render its decision
regarding the validity of the patent at issue. 153 The administrative branch would be

procedure note that adjudicating invalidity issues before the USPTO would be substantially cheaper
than litigation before the judiciary); USPTO, POST-GRANT REVIEW, supra note 1 1.
145 See Meehan, supra note 144, at 10.
146 See Raj Bawa, Nanotechnology Patentingin the US, 1 NANOTECHNOLOGY LAW & BUSINESS
31, 47-50 (2004).
147

See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, General Information, http://

www.icann.org/tr/english.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
148

See Memorandum of Understanding, U.S. Dept. of Commerce-Internet Corporation for

Assigned Names and Numbers, (Nov. 25, 1998), available at http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-

mou-25nov98.htm (creating ICANN).
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See UDRP, supra note 75, at para. 6 (establishing that ICANN is separate from the domain
name dispute arbitrations).
152 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, General Information, http://
www.icann.org/tr/english.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
153 See UDRP, supra note 75, at paras. 4, 6 (requiring arbitration proceedings to take place
before ICANN approved "administrative-dispute-resolution service providers" and not before ICANN
itself).
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responsible for communicating the decisions to the PTO, which would honor the
15 4
decision and act accordingly.
The decision branch would be composed of technical experts with patent
experience. 155 Ideal candidates would be former PTO examiners. The branch would
be divided based on technological expertise.15 6 At the outset of a review proceeding, a
"Panel" would be selected from the pool of experts within the decision branch. 57 The
Panel would consist of one or three people, depending on the request set forth in the
complaint. 58
Ultimately, the Panel would render a decision on the patent's
59
validity.

2. PGROProcedure
1
To commence a validity challenge, a party would file a Complaint with PGRO. 60
The administrative branch would then make an initial determination as to whether
the Complaint complies with PGRO rules of procedure. 16 1 The Complaint would need
to clearly allege which patents or patent claims are being challenged, the basis for
the challenge, and what evidence the Complainant is relying on. 162 Proper
challenges would strictly be limited to the failure to meet statutory requirements for
patenting. 6 3 Defenses to infringement that render a patent unenforceable, such as
inequitable conduct, double patenting, or laches, shall not be determined by PGRO
and would remain the province of the courts. 164 If the complaint is sufficient, PGRO
would forward the Complaint to the patentee, and the validity proceeding would
16 5
formally begin.
The patentee, upon receipt of the complaint, would have the opportunity to file a
Response. 66 The Response would specifically address the Complaint's allegations
and evidence and could provide evidence supporting the validity of the patent
claims. 16 7 Once the PGRO administrative branch receives the Response, it forwards
the file to the decision branch. 6 8 Once at the decision branch, the file is assigned to a
Panel. 6 9 The Panel, in its discretion, may render a decision based on the Complaint
and Response, or it may request additional evidence and hearings. 70
After

See id. at para. 3(c).
See Meehan, supra note 144, at 19.
156 See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dacp/peg/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (listing the
eight Technology Centers utilized by the PTO).
157 See UDRP Rules, supra note 80, at para. 6.
154
155

158

See id.

159 See id. at

para. 15.
See id. at para. 3(a).
161 See id. at para. 4(a).
162 See id. at para. 3(b).
160

163

327(a)).

See S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 5(c) (as introduced Sept. 25, 2008) (proposed 35 U.S.C. §§ 323(3),

See id.
See UDRP Rules, supra note 80, at para. 4(a).
166 See id. at para. 5(a).
167 See id. at para. 5(b)(i).
168 See id. at para. 9.
169 See id. at para. 6(b).
170 See id. at para. 12.
164
165
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considering all evidence and arguments, the Panel would decide whether the
evidence clearly and convincingly shows that the patent claims should be declared
172
invalid. 171 This decision is binding, but may be reviewed by the federal courts.

3. Relation ofPGRO to FederalCourts
PGRO decisions may be reviewed by a district court of competent jurisdiction. 173
The court, however, should give a high degree of deference to the PGRO Panel's
174
decision, and should only reverse the decision upon a finding of abuse of discretion.
This high standard reflects the fact that the Panel rendered its decision using a clear
and convincing evidentiary standard, and the fact that the Panel consists of a(n)
expert(s) in the technical field of the patent. 175 Importantly, while this comment does
not focus on DJ counter-claims, this judicial review standard would apply whether
the invalidity allegation is brought via a DJ complaint or a counter-claim.
The above provisions summarize the type of organization and procedures that
would provide cost-effective, validity dispute resolution. The proposed organization
and rules are not meant to be a complete, exhaustive set of procedures, but are
meant to provide a spring board to a much more complete and thorough system of
review.

B. Post-GrantReview in the Context ofDeclaratoryJudgment Jurisdiction
While proposed legislation has mainly focused on a petitioner seeking to
invalidate one or more patent claims, 176 the PGRO procedure would allow a patentholder to file a defense action. This defense action would not force a potential
complainant into the PGRO process. It would put the potential complainant on
notice that should the party decide to initiate a validity challenge, it must do so
through PGRO. A defense action through PGRO would eliminate the patent-holder's
177
dilemma discussed above.
The hypothetical situations above resulted in the Patentee having to put itself at
risk of DJ jurisdiction, and potential costly litigation, in order to negotiate effectively
with Company, the potential infringer. 178 This risk of DJ jurisdiction, now greatly
171See Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 545 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("An
issued patent enjoys a presumption of validity. Thus, a party challenging patent validity has the
burden to prove its case with clear and convincing evidence.") (citation omitted).
172Compare S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 5(c) (as introduced Sept. 25, 2008) (proposed 35 U.S.C.
§ 322(d)) (providing that a party is estopped from raising a validity challenge in civil litigation that
was raised in a post-grant review proceeding) with Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo
Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 2003) (granting no deference to UDRP
Panel's decision).
173 See UDRP, supra note 75, at para. 4(k).
174See Impax Labs., 545 F.3d at 1314 (stating that the clear and convincing evidentiary
burden is further heightened when the basis for the validity challenge has already been examined).
175See id.
176E.g., S. 3600 § 5(c) (proposed 35 U.S.C. §§ 323(3), 327(a)).
177See supra sec. II.
178See supra sec. II.
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expanded by Medlmmune, coupled with exorbitant litigation costs reduces the value
of the patent. 179 This devaluing of the patent discourages inventors from applying for
patents and potentially decreases the pool of knowledge that the patent system
18 0
discloses.
Implementing a low-cost alternative forum, such as the proposed PGRO
procedure for patent validity disputes, restores the value that was lost to easily
obtainable DJ jurisdiction and litigation.' 8 '
If devaluing a patent discourages
inventors from disclosing their invention, as established above, then increasing the
value most certainly encourages disclosure.
Some have argued that PTO post-grant review offers other benefits to the patent
system.18 2 A party that brings a validity dispute before the PTO instead of a federal
district court avails itself of the technical and patent law expertise of the PTO.183
Some commentators assert that the PTO is better equipped to decide patent issues
than many district courts and that the courts should give great deference to the PTO
in lieu of the PTO's expertise. 8 4 Additionally, the PTO argues that post-grant
reviews would enhance the integrity of the patent system. 8 5 The current system
allows for "a reiteration of the examination process but not ...a fully adversarial
adjudicative process."'1 6 An adversarial procedure would weed out weak patents,
which can be counter-productive to the patent system. 8 7 The proposed PGRO
contains all the benefits of PTO post-grant review without the administrative
nightmare of adding more work to the overburdened PTO.

C. Valdity Limitation
Most post-grant review recommendations, including the proposed PGRO, are
strictly limited to claim validity challenges. 8 8 While alleged infringers have many
other possible defenses besides invalidity, they most commonly raise the invalidity
defense. 18 9 Critics may suggest that removing one issue to an alternate forum will
not decrease the cost of litigation, as the remainder of the dispute will still need to be
litigated before the courts. Many people involved in the patent reform debate,
however, disagree. 19°
179 See Foster, supra note 10, at 22.
180 See supra sec. II.D.
181 See Meehan, supra note 144, at 19.
182 See Meehan, supra note 144, at 19 ("[A post-grant review proceeding] would increase the
accuracy of claim construction, improve patent quality, and decrease the cost of patent litigation.").
183 Id.
184 Id.

185 USPTO, POST-GRANT REVIEW, supra note 11; Meehan, supra note 144, at 19 ("Post-grant
review would also improve patent quality by providing an extra layer of review.").
186 USPTO, POST-GRANT REVIEW, supranote 11.
187 Id.

188 E.g., S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 5(c) (as introduced Sept. 25, 2008) (proposed 35 U.S.C.
§§ 323(3), 327(a)).
189 Simone A. Rose & Debra R. Jessup, Whose Rules Rule? Resolving Etical Conlicts During
the Simultaneous Representation of Clients in Patent Prosecution, 44 IDEA 283, 291 n.33 (2004).
190 See Meehan, supra note 144, at 19 (advocating that post-grant review would assist courts in
the accurate resolution of patent litigation and significantly decrease the cost of patent litigation).
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Post-grant review proceedings would provide district courts with a record
created through an adversarial process by those having technical backgrounds and
expertise in patent law. 191 This record would greatly aid courts, particularly with
192
claim construction, in resolving infringement disputes.

CONCLUSION

In MedImmune, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit's "reasonable
apprehension of suit test" was invalid and that the "all circumstances test" is the
proper test for DJ jurisdiction. 193 The Federal Circuit's application of the "all
circumstances test" in Sony resulted in a holding that mere correspondence that
clearly establishes both parties' positions, which are adverse, is sufficient to find DJ
jurisdiction. 194 In Prasco,however, the Federal Circuit held that where the parties'
correspondence does not clearly state their positions the court does not have DJ
195
jurisdiction.
Sony and Prascoestablished that a patentee puts itself at risk of a DJ suit if it
provides a detailed statement expressing his position that another is infringing his
patent, but that the patentee can avoid this risk through expressing his position in
vague and general terms. 196 In order to resolve a dispute, a party must clearly
communicate its position. 197 In a patent dispute, this communication puts the
198
patentee at risk of suit.
Incorporating the high risk of DJ suit into the value of a patent decreases the
patent's value, particularly the value derived from licensing. 199 To negotiate a
license, the patentee must put itself at risk of costly DJ litigation. 200 The decrease in
patent value due to probable litigation costs will lead to only intrinsically valuable
innovations being patented. 20 1 A patent system that only promotes such a narrow
class of inventions does not further the patent system's goal of encouraging
202
dissemination of ideas and can inhibit innovation.
The creation of a third-party, post-grant review procedure would solve the
problems created by the DJ standard in patent disputes. Patentees and challengers
191 Id.
192

Id.

193 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.ll (2007).
194 Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-86. (Fed. Cir. 2008).
195 Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
196 Compare Sony, 497 F.3d at 1285-86 (holding that a sufficient controversy existed because
the parties correspondence, which included legal research and analysis, clearly established their
adverse positions), with Prasco,537 F.3d at 1340-41 (holding that the patentee's elusive response to
the plaintiffs request not to sue did not give rise to a sufficient case or controversy).
197 See generally55 Am. Jur Trials §§ 11-15 (2009).
198 See Sony, 497 F.3d at 1285-86.
199Foster, supra note 10, at 22.
200

Id.

See generally Beckerman, supra note 131 (discussing business and marketing reasons for
keeping an invention secret instead of pursuing patent protection).
202 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) ("[T]he
201

ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain
through disclosure.").
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would be required to dispute a claim's validity, if validity is in dispute, before the
proposed PGRO prior to litigating in Federal Court. PGRO's validity determination
would be more cost-effective than traditional litigation, thereby restoring the patent's
value. 20 3 Furthermore, PGRO is a viable solution in that it would provide the
benefits of a post-grant review procedure without burdening the PTO. Finally, the
PGRO would be modeled after an already successful public-private, intellectual
property dispute resolution organization. PGRO would make uttering the "Secret
Word" infringement, less daunting, and the audience response would not be quite so
loud.

203

See Meehan, supra note 144, at 19.

